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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Hector Paez (hereinafter Mr. Paez and/or Appellant) appeals 
following a conditional plea of guilty to the crime of felony DUI and persistent 
violator. 
Appellant asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress because the anonymous informant tip from a citizen was insufficient to 
provide reasonable suspicion for his seizure by police. 
Statement of the Facts 
The official versions of the facts as they appear in the PSI are as follows: 
According to the appended police reports, on March 24, 2012 at 
approximately 9:15 pm, Officers Christensen and Coltrin were on 
foot patrol for the Treefort Music Festival in downtown Boise, and 
were approached by MAV Security Supervisor and a private citizen. 
The citizen advised that he had just had contact with a person who 
was "very intoxicated" and trying to drive away from the area in a 
beige colored Ford Taurus. As the citizen described the individual, 
the Security Supervisor said that the description of the man 
sounded like the Hispanic male that she had just ejected from the 
music festival. 
Officers Christensen and Coltrin immediately responded to the 
location where the citizen said the intoxicated individual was 
located, and located the Ford Taurus parked on Main St. They 
observed that the vehicle was running and the brake lights were 
activated, and could see a Hispanic male in the driver's seat, who 
was attempting to get the vehicle into gear. 
Officer Christensen approached the vehicle and tapped on the 
driver's side window, and seconds later, opened the driver's side 
door. He immediately detected a very strong odor of an alcoholic 
beverage coming from inside the vehicle, and the driver, who later 
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Officer Christensen observed that Mr. Paez had slow, slurred 
speech and bloodshot eyes, and Mr. Paez later admitted to 
consuming two (2) to three (3) beers at the music festival. 
STEP Officer Hoffman arrived on the scene and asked Mr. Paez to 
exit the vehicle, which he appeared to have a very difficult time 
doing. Mr. Paez had an unsteady gait and his knees would "unlock" 
while standing, which caused him to quickly dip towards the ground 
before catching his balance. Officer Hoffman attempted to 
administer standardized field sobriety tests, and as he was 
explaining the Walk and Turn Test, Mr. Paez's demeanor changed 
and he refused to cooperate with the remaining tests. Officer 
Hoffman placed Mr. Paez under arrest for suspicion of driving 
under the influence of alcohol, and transported him to the Ada 
County Jail for a blood draw. 
At the Ada County Jail, Mr. Paez became very belligerent and 
argumentative, and advised that he would not comply with the 
blood draw process. Officer Mitchell was able to talk him into 
cooperating, and two (2) samples were collected, resulting in a 
blood alcohol level of .324. 
PSI, p. 3. 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Paez was charged by criminal complaint (and later information) with 
felony operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 'of alcohol (one felony 
conviction within 15 years) and misdemeanor driving without privileges. (R. p. 5, 
27.) An information part II was filed charging him with persistent violator. (R. p. 
39-41.) 
Mr. Paez filed a motion to suppress his seizure and all evidence obtained 
thereafter, which was denied after a hearing. (R. p. 46-53, 63.) He then entered 
a conditional guilty plea in which he pied guilty to the felony DUI and persistent 
violator and expressly reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress. (R. p. 66, 67-73.) 
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The court sentenced Mr. Paez to 15 years with the first 3 years fixed. (R. 
p. 76.) 
Mr. Paez timely appeals. (R. p. 82.) 
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ISSUE 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE POLICE OFFICER LACKED REASONABLE 
SUSPICION TO SEIZE MR. PAEZ 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
BECAUSE THE POLICE OFFICER LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO SEIZE MR. PAEZ 
A. Standard of review 
As to the standard of review for this issue, State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 
(2009), explained as follows: 
When reviewing a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to 
suppress, this Court gives deference to the trial court's findings of 
fact, which will be upheld so long as they are not clearly erroneous. 
Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Decisions regarding the 
credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, 
and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of 
the trial court. This Court exercises free review, however, over the 
trial court's conclusions regarding "whether constitutional 
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found." 
Accordingly, this Court freely reviews the constitutionality of a 
search and seizure. 
Id. at p. 810 (internal citations omitted). 
B. The evidence and court's ruling 
At the end of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the court made the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
The events occurred on March 26, 2012, in Boise, Ada County, 
Idaho. 
The reporting officer, Sergeant Christensen, was attending a 
festival, where there was a beer garden. Beer was sold. 
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He was approached by Mr. Lynn McConkie, a security officer well 
known to Sergeant Christensen, and another unidentified person, 
and he was told - it's not clear who told him, but it sounds like it 
was the unidentified person - that a Hispanic male was highly 
intoxicated, that he was attempting to drive away in a beige Ford 
Taurus, and Mr. McConkie indicated that it sounded like the 
Hispanic person who had just been kicked out of the beer garden 
area because he was intoxicated and causing problems. 
The officer started over to the area that was described as the 
location of the Ford Taurus, could see that the brake lights were on, 
that the engine was running, and he decided that he better get 
there in a hurry. 
So he ran over, could observe that the driver of the vehicle, in fact, 
was Hispanic, and had a -- looked, as I recall was sleepy and was 
having difficulty in carrying out the simple act of putting the car into 
gear. Also, observed that the motor of the vehicle was running at 
that time. 
Seems to me at this point under Terry versus Ohio the officer had 
more than a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, specifically 
that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol, and that the officers' actions thereafter were 
fully justified and came within the exception to warrant requirement. 
There is nothing - and just as an aside, I know it's not a very 
important issue at this point, but clearly the reporting individual was 
not a paid informant, but a citizen informant, even though his 
identity is at this point unknown. So considering all of those facts, I 
think - I conclude that this was a valid Terry stop, and the motion 
to suppress is denied. 
That'. s my findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. 
Tr. p. 41, In. 8--p. 43, In. 2. 
C. The court erred in denying the motion to suppress 
The relevant legal standards are well established and are set forth by a 
somewhat similar case, to wit, State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 (2009): 
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This guarantee has been incorporated 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
apply to the states. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 
S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 86 Ohio Law Abs. 513 (1961). 
Evidence obtained in violation of the amendment may not be used 
as evidence against the victim of the illegal government action. 
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,846,103 P.3d 454,459 (2004); see 
also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S. Ct. 407, 
9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). This rule, known as the exclusionary rule, 
applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal government 
action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the 
original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree. Page, 140 Idaho 
at 846, 103 P.3d at 459; Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88. The test is 
"'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the 
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of [the original] illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."' Wong Sun, 371 
U.S. at 488 (quoting MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 
(1959)). Under this test, evidence that is sufficiently attenuated from 
the illegal government action may be admitted at trial. Page, 140 
Idaho at 846, 103 P.3d at 459; see also Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 
488. When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds 
that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
government carries the burden of proving that the search or seizure 
in question was reasonable. State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 
486, 95 P.3d 635, 637 (2004). 
The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement has been 
held to apply to brief investigatory detentions. See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). To 
determine whether such seizures are reasonable, courts first ask 
"whether the officer's action was justified at its inception." Id. at 19-
20. The level of justification required depends on the intrusiveness 
of the seizure. Id. at 20-22. Next, they consider whether the action 
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 19-20. 
Typically, seizures must be based on probable cause to be 
reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500, 103 S. Ct. 
1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). However, limited investigatory 
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible 
when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a 
person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Id. at 498. 
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Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts 
and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. See 
State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. 
App. 2003); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The quantity and quality of 
information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less 
than that necessary to establish probable cause. Alabama v. White, 
496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990). Still, 
reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or 
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." Id. at 329 (quoting 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. 
Ed. 2d 1 (1989)). Whether an officer possessed reasonable 
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances 
known to the officer at or before the time of the stop. Sheldon, 139 
Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981). 
Id. 810-811 (footnote omitted). 
Bishop, like our case, involved a tip from an informant. In Bishop, the 
Hagerman Police Chief received a call from the City Superintendent who advised 
the chief that two carnival workers who were in working in town, approached him 
and indicated that a man had tried to sell them methamphetamine and had asked 
the City Superintendent to report the incident to police. The City Superintendent 
relayed the workers' description of the man who was then located by the police 
chief. After a series of events not relevant here, the man was arrested and 
brought to the carnival workers who identified him as the man who had tried to 
sell them methamphetamine. 
The Idaho Supreme Court describe the law as it relates to informant's tips. 
An informant's tip regarding suspected criminal activity may give 
rise to reasonable suspicion when it would "warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that a stop was appropriate." White, 
496 U.S. at 329 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22) (internal quotation 
and alteration marks omitted). Whether a tip amounts to reasonable 
suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances including the 
substance, source, and reliability of the information provided. See 
id. at 328-29 (noting that "an informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and 
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'basis of knowledge"' are highly relevant factors in determining 
whether reasonable suspicion exists). In other words, a tip must] 
possess adequate indicia of reliability in order to justify a Terry 
stop. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. 
Ed. 2d 612 (1972). The more reliable the tip, the less information 
required to establish reasonable suspicion. White, 496 U.S. at 330. 
Factors indicative of reliability include whether the informant reveals 
his or her identity and the basis of his or her knowledge, whether 
the location of the informant is known, whether the information was 
based on first-hand observations of events as they were occurring, 
whether the information the informant provided was subject to 
immediate confirmation or corroboration by police, whether the 
informant has previously provided reliable information, whether the 
informant provides predictive information, and whether the 
informant could be held criminally liable if the report were 
discovered to be false. White, 496 U.S. at 331-32; Williams, 407 
U.S. at 146-47; State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101-02, 15 P.3d 
334, 336-37 (Ct. App. 2000). If a tip lacks adequate indicia of 
reliability, police generally must engage in further investigation 
before conducting a Terry stop. Williams, 407 U. S. at 147. 
Whether a tip that merely provides a description of a suspect and 
alleges that he or she committed a crime amounts to reasonable 
suspicion depends on whether the tip was anonymous. See Florida 
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271-72, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 
(2000); see also State v. Van Dome, 139 Idaho 961, 965, 88 P.3d 
780, 784 (Ct. App. 2004). When such a tip is received from an 
anonymous informant, the tip generally will not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 271-72 (concluding that 
a tip that a young man was carrying a gun did not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion because the anonymous informant merely 
alleged that the man committed a crime and provided a description 
of the suspect). On the other hand, when such a tip is received 
from a known citizen-informant, the tip is generally sufficient to 
establish reasonable suspicion. Van Dome, 139 Idaho at 965, 88 
P.3d at 784 (concluding that a known citizen-informant's tip 
indicating that the suspect was likely intoxicated and describing the 
suspect's vehicle provided police with reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a stop). Tips made by known citizen-informants are 
presumed reliable because the informant's reputation can be 
assessed and, if the informant is untruthful, he or she may be 
subject to criminal liability for making a false report. Id. Accordingly, 
independent police verification of such tips is generally not 
necessary. Id.; see also Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47. Still, under 
the totality of the circumstances analysis, the content of the tip and 
the informant's basis of knowledge remain relevant in determining 
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whether the tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion. See State v. 
Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 708, 169 P.3d 291, 296 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
An informant need not necessarily give the police his or her name 
to be considered a known citizen-informant. Larson, 135 Idaho at 
102, 15 P.3d at 337; see also United States v. Pasquaril/e, 20 F.3d 
682, 687 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that an informant who called in 
a report of drug dealing was not anonymous because he identified 
himself as a person that was transporting prisoners and personally 
observed the reported illegal activity). Typically, any information 
that makes the informant's identity readily ascertainable will suffice. 
Larson, 135 Idaho at 102, 15 P.3d at 337; see also United States v. 
Reaves, 512 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that police may 
conclude tipster is credible when he or she "provides enough 
information to allow the police to readily trace her identity"). This is 
especially true when it is clear that the informant is not trying to 
conceal his or her identity; for example, when the informant is 
seeking police assistance or reporting illegal activity that he or she 
personally observed. Larson, 135 Idaho at 102, 15 P.3d at 337. 
Id. p. 811-812 (emphasis added). 
In Bishop, the Appellant argued that the tip should be regarded as 
anonymous since the City Superintendent's report was based on information 
obtained from two unnamed carnival workers. 
If Bishop's characterization of the tip as anonymous were correct, 
the tip would not give rise to reasonable suspicion because it 
merely alleged that Bishop had committed a crime and provided a 
description of his present appearance and location. Miller would 
have had to corroborate the tip or conduct an independent 
investigation in order to legally stop Bishop. See White, 496 U.S. at 
330-32. 
Bishop's argument for characterizing the tip as anonymous is 
unpersuasive. Superintendent Kelley, the individual who actually 
reported Bishop's alleged attempt to sell methamphetamine, was a 
known citizen-informant. There is no dispute that Chief Miller knew 
Kelley's identity at the time Kelley phoned in the tip. Further, by 
reporting the tip to Chief Miller, Kelley subjected himself to possible 
criminal liability under Idaho Code section 18-705, which makes it a 
crime to "knowingly give[] a false report to any peace officer." 
Because Kelley was a known citizen-informant, his reliability is 
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presumed. 
The fact that Kelley's tip was based on a report from two unnamed 
carnival workers does not transform his report into an anonymous 
tip. Instead, the source of Kelley's information is only relevant in 
assessing his basis of knowledge. Bishop points to no authority to 
support the proposition that a citizen-informant's tip should be 
reclassified as anonymous based solely on his or her basis of 
knowledge. Moreover, Bishop's argument disregards the fact that 
the carnival workers were not anonymous; instead, their identities 
were readily ascertainable. Kelley provided police with sufficient 
information to trace the workers' identities. This is evidenced by 
the fact that Deputy Smith was able to locate the workers and have 
them identify Bishop after he was arrested. And, while it is not clear 
why the workers reported their allegations to Superintendent Kelley 
rather than directly to the police, there is no evidence that the 
workers were trying to conceal their identities. Because both Kelley 
and the carnival workers were known citizen-informants, the tip is 
presumptively reliable. Under the totality of the circumstances, 
however, the content of the tip and the informants' basis of 
knowledge are still relevant. 
Id. p. 812-813. 
Our case has some important differences which show that the tip was truly 
anonymous and was not corroborated. First of all, the district court did remember 
correctly that it was the citizen informant, and not the security officer known to 
the police officer, who provided the information about the suspect. (Tr. p. 21, Ins. 
22-25.) So out case is not like Bishop where the City Superintendant was known 
to the police chief and so the report was not from an anonymous informant. 
Further, since the security officer did not provide the information, unl_ike the City 
Superintendent in Bishop, he had no potential liability for false report. 
Next, in our case unlike in Bishop, the citizen informant was not just 
unnamed, but the police were unable to find him again. The police officer testified 
at the suppression hearing that he did not know the citizen (and was not aware of 
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any prior contacts with him) and when they went back later to try and find him 
they were unable to locate him. (Tr. p. 22, In. 1-4.) 
To summarize, an unnamed person came up to the police and provided a 
description of a person and alleged he was committing a crime. As explained 
above, this is an anonymous tip which does not give rise to reasonable 
suspicion. To make matters worse, the police were later unable to locate that 
person and so he did not later identify Mr. Paez as the subject of his allegations. 
What's more, the fact that the person was accompanied by a security 
guard known to the police changes nothing, because there was no evidence that 
he knew the citizen either. The information was not relayed through the security 
guard and so citizen's story was not in any way enhanced by the security guard's 
pre-existing credibility with the police, and the security guard was not subject to 
the consequences of a false report since he did not report a crime. 
Further, the tip was not corroborated by the security guard. While he 
claimed that the anonymous informant's description sounds like the description 
of someone just ejected from the beer garden, the description was merely that 
he was an intoxicated Hispanic male. The officer testified that there were several 
hundred, if not a few thousand, people in the area for the event. (Tr. p. 14, In. 
25-p. 15, In. 2.) Given, this, what is basically just a racial identification is too 
general to have provided any meaningful corroboration. Further, the police officer 
testified that the security guard did not go with him over to where Mr. Paez was 
located, nor positively identified him at any time. (Tr. p. 28, In. 24-p. 29, In. 14.) 
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Likewise, the observations of the police officer, that the driver of the car 
looked sleepy and appeared to be having trouble putting the car in gear, were 
just too general to corroborate the anonymous tip. By the way, this was all 
observed through the closed window of a car when it was dark out. (Tr. p. 16, In. 
2; p. 19, In. 14.) 
It is undisputable that Mr. Paez was seized when the officer opened his 
car door. But since there was no reasonable suspicion to seize him, his Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated, and so the evidence following that seizure 
must be suppressed and the court erred when it held otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Paez requests this Court reverse the order of the district court denying 
his motion to suppress and remand this matter to the district court for withdrawal 
of his guilty plea and further proceedings without the u . nstitutionally obtained 
evidence. , ... -· / . ~ 
DATED th1~ ~ay of June, 2013. 
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